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Abstract: In this paper, a sophism attributed to Chrysippus of Soli by Diogenes 
Laërtius is reviewed. To do that, the general framework of the mental models theory is 
assumed, and the conclusion is that the sophism is a problem only if just its logical form 
is considered. If the semantic and pragmatic aspects involved in it are also taken into 
account, the difficulties disappear and it can be easily understood why people tend to 
reject the conclusion of sophisms such as the aforementioned one. In this way, another 
point in which the paper insists is that, probably, syntax and logical form are not the 
main elements in reasoning and language. 
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O SOFISMA DA MEGARA E A ATENAS: A SINTAXE NÃO É SUFICIENTE 
Resumo: Neste artigo, um sofisma atribuído a Crisipo de Soli por Diógenes Laércio é 
revisado. Fazer isso, pressupõe-se o arcabouço geral da teoria dos modelos mentais, e a 
conclusão é que o sofisma é um problema apenas se só sua forma lógica é considerada. 
Se os aspectos semânticos e pragmáticos envolvidos nele também são levados em conta, 
as dificuldades desaparecem e pode ser facilmente entendido por que as pessoas tendem 
a rejeitar a conclusão de sofismas como o acima mencionado. Desse modo, outro ponto 
em que o artigo insiste é que, provavelmente, a sintaxe e a forma lógica não são os 
principais elementos do raciocínio e da linguagem.  
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Introduction 
The experimental evidence recently reported in the cognitive science literature seems to 
suggest that reasoning has nothing to do with logical forms. This is an idea mainly 
claimed by the proponents of an important cognitive theory nowadays: the mental 
models theory (e.g., JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2015; JOHNSON-
LAIRD, KHEMLANI, & GOODWIN, 2015; KHEMLANI, LOTSTEIN, TRAFTON, & 
JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2015; RAGNI, SONNTAG, & JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2016; 
QUELHAS, RASGA, & JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2017). According to it, what is truly 
important in the inferential activity is the set of possibilities that can be assigned to each 
sentence, since inferring a conclusion is basically comparing and combining such 
possibilities. 
In this way, the literature shows that frameworks such as this one are able to explain 
many cognitive facts that approaches essentially based on logic and logical forms 
cannot. Some of those facts are related to the problems linked to some sophisms 
provided in Ancient Greece. As it is well known, those sophisms often have a logical 
form such that, following standard logic, their conclusion is necessarily derived from 
their premises. However, they are unacceptable for most of the people. Thus, it can be 
thought that the mental models theory (from now on, MMT) has the machinery that is 
needed to account for such problems, and, in fact, it has already been argued that this is 
precisely the case with regard to a particular sophism that it is not clear whether it was 
proposed by Chrysippus of Soli or Eubulides: the horns sophism (LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, 
2016a). 
In this paper, I try to go a step further in this direction and show that MMT can also 
explain what happens in the case of sophisms of other kind, that is, of sophisms such as 
that attributed to Chrysippus of Soli by Diogenes Laërtius and that refers to the cities of 
Megara and Athens, and to the concept of human being. To do that, I will firstly 
describe this sophism and indicate why can be considered to be a problem if it is 
assumed that human language is about logical forms and reasoning is led by first-order 
  Polymatheia 








predicate calculus. Then I will also argue that MMT can deal with that very sophism 
and provide an account of the reasons why people usually reject its conclusion. So, I 
begin by commenting on the sophism. 
 
The Megara and Athens sophism and standard logic 
The place in which the sophism is to be found is a work authored by Diogenes Laërtius, 
Vitae Philosophorum, and it is exactly in 7.187. It is originally expressed in Ancient 
Greek as follows: 
εἰ τις ἐστιν ἐν Μεγάροις, οὐκ ἐστιν ἐν Ἀθήναις· ἄνθρωπος δ’ ἐστιν ἐν Μεγάροις· οὐκ 
ἄρ’ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος ἐν Ἀθήναις (see also, e.g., BOERI & SALLES, 2014, p. 247). 
Thus, a possible translation of it can be ‘If something is in Megara, it is not in Athens; 
human being is in Megara; so human being is not in Athens’. 
In principle, one might think that this argument is wrong and that its conclusion cannot 
be accepted. Nevertheless, the problem is that it seems to be absolutely correct in first-
order predicate logic. This can be clearly noted if we identify the logical forms of the 
premises, since it in turn will enable to check that, indeed, the conclusion can be drawn 
from them in that logic. Let us assume the following equivalences: 
 
: universal quantifier 
M: being in Megara 
: conditional relationship 
¬: logical negation 
A: being in Athens 
h: human being 
 
If this is so, the logical forms of the premises are these ones: 
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x (Mx  ¬Ax) 
Mh 
 
And it is almost trivial to explain the way the conclusion [¬Ah] can be deduced from 
the premises [x (Mx  ¬Ax)] and [Mh] in standard calculus. True, in this calculus, 
this derivation is undoubtedly valid: 
 
[1] x (Mx  ¬Ax)   (premise) 
[2] Mh     (premise) 
[3] Mh  ¬Ah   (UQE 1) 
[4] ¬Ah    (MP 2, 3) 
 
Where ‘UQE’ represents the universal quantifier elimination rule, that this, the rule that 
allows deriving a formula such as [Pa] from a formula such as [x Px], and ‘MP’ refers 
to the Modus Ponendo Ponens rule, that is, the rule that allows deriving a formula such 
as [q] from formulae such as [p  q] and [p]. 
But, if it is so and the conclusion can be formally inferred from the premises in first-
order predicate logic, it is necessary to explain why people tend not to accept this kind 
of inference. As said, MMT can give such an explanation. 
 
The Megara and Athens sophism and MMT 
As mentioned, MMT considers logical form not to be important in the deductive mental 
processes (JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2010). In fact, in its view, given that, in many cases, it 
is very hard to find the actual logical forms corresponding to the sentences, it does not 
appear to be justified to suppose that the human mind works applying formal schemata 
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to logical structures recovered from sentences in natural language (see also, e.g., 
JOHNSON-LAIRD ET AL., 2015, p. 202). What happens is that the conclusions 
deduced by individuals sometimes match those expected in standard logic, and this is 
what causes us to think that human reasoning follows standard logic, when this is not 
really so. 
For the theory, what is important is meaning, context, and pragmatics, as, from semantic 
contents and taking pragmatic factors into account, people build models referring to the 
different possibilities implied by the sentences. Nevertheless, such models have a 
number of characteristics that come from the basic principles of MMT. For this paper, 
two of those principles are more relevant: ‘the principle of iconicity’ and ‘the principle 
of possibilities’. According to the first one, “A mental model has a structure that 
corresponds to the known structure of what it represents” (JOHNSON-LAIRD, 2012, p. 
136). The connections between MMT and Peirce (1931-1958) in this regard are obvious 
and the adherents of the theory often make them explicit (see, e.g., JOHNSON-LAIRD, 
2012, p. 137; JOHNSON-LAIRD ET AL., 2015, p. 207). The other principle provides 
that “Each mental model represents a distinct possibility, that is, it captures what is 
common to all the different ways in which the possibility might occur” (JOHNSON-
LAIRD, 2012, p. 137). 
Thus, based on all of this, it is clear that, as said, the human intellectual activity is not 
about the recovery of logical forms, and that the models corresponding to the first 
premise of the Megara and Athens sophism can be, in principle, akin to these ones: 
 
[I]: M    ¬A 
[II]: ¬M    ¬A 
[III]: ¬M    A 
 
These are, according to MMT, the models that can be usually linked to conditional 
sentences such as the aforementioned premise, but one important point needs to be 
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clarified here. Although these three possible scenarios can remember the cases in which 
a conditional is true in a truth table of standard logic, this is only a coincidence. As 
indicated, the models are mental representations that are iconic and, therefore, they 
represent, by virtue of the two principles mentioned above, complete situations in 
which, everything else being the same, being in Megara and being in Athens are the 
only facts that change. The use of the letters ‘M’ and ‘A’ hence is only a resource to 
simplify the expression of models that are far more complex. In this way, what [I] 
stands for is a general situation in which something is in Megara but not in Athens. 
Likewise, [II] refers to a global scenario in which something is neither in Megara nor in 
Athens. Finally, [III] represents the complete circumstance in which something is not in 
Megara but it does be in Athens. 
It is true that MMT assumes that people do not always identify all the possibilities of a 
sentence, since it can depend, for example, on individuals’ attention or reflection level. 
However, what is important now is that, even in the case in which all the models of the 
first premise of the Megara and Athens sophism are detected, following MMT, that does 
not lead to its conclusion. The reason is evident if we pay attention to what the second 
premise really provides. The point is that this last premise does not mean that a 
particular element or individual is in Megara, but it refers to ‘human being’, that is, a 
concept or set consisting of different elements. So, that all the human beings are in 
Megara does not seem to be the best interpretation for an asseveration such as ‘human 
being is in Megara’. A more suitable interpretation is clearly that at least some of them 
are in that city. In fact, this last meaning is, predictably, the one that all of us would give 
the premise if it were said that ‘human being is in Megara’, since, obviously, this is 
similar to the situation in which we are said that human being has been in the Moon. We 
do not interpret that all the human beings have been there, but at least some of them. 
Therefore, the question would be now the number of human beings that are in Megara. 
MMT also assumes that working memory is limited and, as it can be noted in papers 
such as that of Khemlani et al. (2015), when it reviews quantified sentences, it often 
considers only 3 to 5 elements. For simplicity, I will work here with just 3 elements, as 
it is not hard to check that all I will argue below can be easily applied to universes with 
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more and less elements. In this way, it can be thought that, for example, [a], [b], and [c] 
are three human beings, that is, three elements in the general set of human beings, and 







Clearly, these three models are incompatible with both [II] and [III], and the reason is 
evident: in these two last models a clause is [¬M], which means that the particular 
element, in this case, the particular human being, is not in Megara. Accordingly, the 
only remaining possibility is [I], that is, the model in which [M] is true and [¬A] is true 
too, or, if preferred, [A] is false. And this allows us to complete the models [Ma], [Mb], 
and [Mc] in this way: 
 
Ma     ¬Aa 
Mb     ¬Ab 
Mc     ¬Ac 
 
Maybe it is trivial to describe what these last three models represent, but, for clarity, I 
will do that. The first one means that the human being [a] is in Megara and is not in 
Athens. The second one denotes the same situation for [b]. And, likewise, the last one 
describes exactly the same scenario in the case of [c]. Nonetheless, what is truly 
interesting here is that these are the only conclusions that can actually be drawn from 
the premises, and, as shown, none of them indicates that ‘human being is not in Athens’. 
The only conclusions that can be derived are that certain particular individuals, in my 
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example, [a], [b], and [c], are in Megara and, therefore, they cannot be in Athens. And it 
is the reason why people tend to reject the sophism: their real mental representations do 
not lead to its conclusion, but to other ones that are simpler and not so general. 
 
Conclusions 
It hence seems that, as argued by López-Astorga (2016a) in the case of the horns 
sophism, logical form is not the main aspect in the processes of human communication, 
language, and inferential activity. This paper appears to be one more proof in this 
direction and reveal, again, that semantics, contexts, meanings, and pragmatics can be 
more important. 
These results have been achieved by virtue of an analysis methodology based on the 
main theses of MMT, and there is no doubt that such a methodology can also be very 
useful in other tasks, for example, to interpret from another perspective ancient theories, 
logics, or arguments that, by the fact that they are inconsistent with standard logic, can 
be considered to be wrong. MMT can allow reviewing such theories, logics, or 
arguments from a different point of view and so show their real sense, which can have 
been ignored for a long time because of the primacy of standard logic. In fact, there are 
already attempts in this way addressing several ancient frameworks and theses (see, e.g., 
LÓPEZ-ASTORGA, 2016b). 
On the other hand, a study of the real possibilities of the sentences such as that of MMT 
can also be relevant in fields such as the one of translation. It is evident that knowing 
such possibilities can be a big help with the activities of that field. And this is so 
because they can show what the sentences truly mean and how to translate them into 
other languages as closely as possible. Clearly, this is another research line that deserves 
to be explored. 
In any case, perhaps the most important conclusion provided by this paper is that, as far 
as certain human linguistic and intellectual processes are concerned, researching only 
logical forms (and, therefore, syntactic aspects) can be a clear simplification and to 
adopt a very poor perspective. It is clear that inferences are not purely formal, and the 
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reason is that syntax determines neither the meaning of the sentences nor the 
possibilities to which they refer. In fact, the role played by semantics and pragmatics 
appear to be much more critical. And this what explains problems such as, for example, 
the fact that, as said, it is hard to find the true logical forms of the sentences for the 
logicians, and the fact that the automatic translators that review the forms of the 
sentences and translate literally each of their words are not very exact. So, MMT is an 
approach that one might assume or not, but, undoubtedly, it appears to offer certain 
study lines that it is worth at least taking into account.  
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